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2.1  Introduction and Summary 
During the  1970s an extensive  theoretical  literature developed  analyzing 
market determination  of  freely  floating  exchange rates.  At  the  same time, 
there has been extensive and continuous  intervention in the market  by  cen- 
tral  banks.  Exchange  rates  have  not  been  floating  freely;  they  have  been 
managed, or manipulated,  by central banks.  However,  most of the descrip- 
tion  of  exchange rate  policy, as actually  practiced,  has  been  informal,  or 
“literary,”  not  integrated  with  the  formal  theoretical  literature.  Examples 
are the surveys in Branson  (1  980) and Mussa  (1  98  1). 
Rather  than  reproduce  Mussa’s  excellent  review  (1981), in  this  paper  I 
integrate exchange rate policy  into a model of  exchange rate behavior  and 
examine the data econometrically to infer hypotheses about policy behavior 
in the  1970s. I focus on four major currencies, the United States dollar, the 
deutschemark,  sterling,  and  the  Japanese  yen,  and  analyze movements  in 
their effective  (weighted)  exchange rates  as calculated by the  International 
Monetary Fund for their relative cost and price data. 
In section 2.2 a model of market determination of a floating exchange rate 
is  laid  out.  It  is  a  rational  expectations  version  of  the  model  in  Branson 
(1977), and it draws on the model of Kouri (1978): The model shows how 
unanticipated  movements  in money, the current account,  and relative price 
levels  will  cause  first a jump in  the  exchange rate  and  then  a  movement 
along a saddle path to the new long-run equilibrium.  Here the role of news 
in moving the exchange rate, as recently  emphasized by  Dornbusch (1980) 
and Frenkel (198  l), is clear. The model emphasizes imperfect substitutabil- 
ity between domestic and foreign bonds,  in order to prepare for the analysis 
of intervention policy in section 2.3. 
Exchange rate policy is introduced in section 2.3. We analyze the options 
available to the central bank that wants to reduce the jump in the exchange 
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rate following a real or monetary disturbance-news  about the current ac- 
count, relative prices, or money. This is the policy characterized as “leaning 
against the wind”  in Branson (1976). The distinction is made between mon- 
etary policy and sterilized intervention. We also study a regime in which the 
domestic interest rate is used as the policy variable. 
In sections 2.4 and 2.5 we  turn to the data. These are described system- 
atically in section 2.4, where we investigate the time series properties of the 
exchange rate,  money,  relative prices,  and the current account, the  short- 
term interest rate, and reserves for each of  the four countries. It  is difficult 
to  summarize these data,  but  the time series behavior of  exchange rates, 
money, relative prices, and current account balances are roughly consistent 
with the model of  section 2.2. 
In section 2.5 we estimate systems of vector autoregressions (VARs) for 
each of the countries and study the correlations among their residuals. These 
represent the  innovations, or  “news,”  in the time  series.  A  clear pattern 
emerges in these correlations, in  which policy in the United States and to a 
lesser extent Japan drives exchange rates,  and policy  in Germany and the 
United  Kingdom reacts.  It  appears that  United  States monetary  policy  is 
essentially determined by  domestic considerations, with  the exchange rate 
moving as a consequence. In Japan, interest rates are varied in  response to 
movement  in the current account and relative price levels, and the effects 
on the exchange rate are partially neutralized by sterilized intervention. Ger- 
many and the United Kingdom react to movements in their exchange rates 
by  moving interest rates and sterilized intervention. 
2.2  An Asset Market Model with Rational Expectations 
2.2.1  Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to lay out a simple asset market model of 
exchange rate determination within which monetary policy reaction to move- 
ments in the exchange rate can be analyzed. The literature of the 1970s has 
identified three principal macroeconomic variables that influence movements 
in  exchange  rates.  These  are  money  supplies,  relative  price  levels,  and 
current account balances.  Here  I  develop a representative model  that  ex- 
plicitly includes all three elements. The model is an  extension of  the asset 
market model sketched in Branson (1975) and developed in full in Branson 
(1977).  It  is a close relative of  Kouri (1978).  In  the early versions of  this 
model the focus was on the roles of  relative prices and asset markets, and 
static expectations were assumed. Here the model is extended to study the 
effects of  underlying  “real”  disturbances influencing the  current  account 
and to include explicitly policy intervention in a rational expectations frame- 
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2.2.2 Asset Market Specification 
To make the analysis manageable,  let us consider one country in a many- 
country world.  We can aggregate the assets available in this country into a 
domestic money stock M, which is a noneaming  asset; holdings of domes- 
tically issued  assets B, which are denominated  in  home  currency; and  net 
holdings  of  foreign-issued  assets  F, which  are  dominated  in  foreign  ex- 
change.’ Bonds, Bp, is government debt held by the private sector,  and B‘ 
is government  debt held  by  the central bank.  Total  government  debt B  = 
Bp + B‘.  Foreign  assets, P,  is  the  net  claims  on foreigners  held  by  the 
domestic  private  sector, and R  is central bank  foreign reserves.  Total  na- 
tional  net claims on foreigners F  = P  + R. The money  stock M  is equal 
to R  + B‘,  with a  100% reserve system.  I  assume the initial exchange rate 
is indexed to unity, and that the central bank does not permit capital gains 
or  losses  on  R  to  influence  M. Similarly,  interest  income  on  the  central 
bank’s holding of R is assumed to be turned over to the treasury  so  that it 
does not affect M.  The current account in the balance of payments gives the 
rate of  accumulation  of F  over time.  The rate of accumulation of B  is the 
government  deficit. M  is controlled by central bank purchases (or sales) of 
B or F from (or to) the domestic private sector. 
The rate of return  on F  is given  by 7,  fixed in  the world  capital  market, 
plus the expected rate of increase in the exchange rate,  2. The rate of return 
on B  is the domestic  interest rate r, to be determined in domestic financial 
markets. Total private sector wealth,  at any point in time, is given by W = 
M  + Bp + eP,  so  here the exchange rate e, in home currency per unit of 
foreign  exchange  (e.g.,  $0.50  per  DM),  translates  the  foreign  exchange 
value of  F into home currency. 
The total  supplies of B  and F  to the national economy  are given at each 
point in time. Each  can be accumulated  only over time through foreign or 
domestic investment.* Given the existing stocks of B  and F  at any point in 
time, the central bank  can make discrete changes in M  by  swapping either 
1, Since the analysis here applies to any single country in the international financial system, 
1 use the terms “home”  and  “foreign”  to denote the country being discussed and  the rest of 
the system, respectively.  At the level of  generality of this discussion no damage would be done 
if  the reader  substituted United States for “home  country,”  “dollar”  for  “home currency,” 
and “Fed”  for “central  bank.” 
2.  Since F  is  home claims on foreigners less home liabilities to  foreigners, an asset swap 
which exchanges a claim and a liability with a foreign asset holder is a transaction within F, 
changing  claims and  liabilities  by  the  same  amount.  This transaction  would  leave F  and  B 
unchanged.  The reason for using this particular aggregation will  become clear when  we study 
dynamic adjustment  below.  Basically,  we  want to define net  foreign assets consistently  with 
the balance of  payments  and national income and  product accounts,  which record the capital 
account  balance  as the  change  in  United  States private  holdings  of  net  foreign  assets.  The 
assumptions outlined above make M and B  nontraded assets. This implies that the total  stocks 
of M,  B, and F  in domestic portfolios are given at any point in time. 82  William H. Branson 
B or F with the domestic private sector; these are open-market operations in 
government debt or foreign assets. 
The demand for each asset by  the private sector depends on wealth, W = 
M + BP  +  ep,  and both  rates of  return,  r  and f  +  2.  As  wealth rises, 
demands for  all three  assets increase.  The  demands for B  and  F depend 
positively on their own rates of  return and negatively on those of  the other 
assets. The demand for money depends negatively on both r and 7  + 2;  as 
either rises, asset holders attempt to shift from money into the asset whose 
return has increased. 
These asset market equilibrium conditions are summarized in  equations 
(lt(6). 
(1) 
(2)  Bp = b(r, 7 + 2)  W. 
(3)  eFp = f(r,  7 + 2)  *  W. 
(4)  W = M  + BP + eFp. 
(5)  B"  + Bp = B. 
(6)  P+R=F. 
Equation (4) is the balance sheet constraint, which ensures that m  + b  + 
f  =  1. The three demand functions give the desired distribution of  the do- 
mestic wealth portfolio W into the three assets. Specifying the asset demand 
functions as homogeneous in wealth eliminates the price level from the asset 
market equilibrium conditions. Given the balance sheet constraint (4),  and 
gross substitutability of  the three assets, we  have the constraints on  partial 
derivatives of  the distribution functions: 
M = R  + B"  = m(r, f  + 2)  -  W. 
m, + fr =  -6,  < 0  mF  + bF  =  -f; < 0. 
Here a subscript denotes a partial derivative. The three market equilibrium 
conditions  (  1  t(3) contain  two  independent  equations  given  the  balance 
sheet constraint (4). In equation (5) the bar over B  indicates that  the total 
supply of government debt is fixed. 
2.2.3  Asset Accumulation and the Current Account 
Equations (1  t(6) provide the specification of asset markets in the model. 
The other main building block of the model is the current account equation. 
The balance of payments accounts provide the indentity. 
F = Fp + R  =X + 7(Fp + R)  EX  + fF 
where X  is net exports of goods and noncapital services in terms of  foreign 
exchange. Net exports depend on the real exchange rate elP, private sector 
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which  represents  real  events  such as  changes  in  tastes  in  technology, oil 
discoveries, and so on, which  increase  net exports for given  values of  eiP 
and W.  Thus we can write 
X  = X(e/P,  W,  z);  X, > 0, Xw < 0, X, > 0. 
The sign  of  X, assumes the Marshall-Lerner  condition  holds;  Xw reflects 
wealth effects on import demand. 
Substitution  of the function  for net exports into the balance of payments 
identity gives us the equation for accumulation of national net foreign assets: 
(7) 
It is important to note that open-market swaps between the central bank and 
the  domestic private  sector have no direct effect  on either W or F  in  (7). 
And the effect of accumulation of national net foreign assets through  a cur- 
rent account surplus (b > 0) on both  W and F is the same regardless of the 
distribution  of F between Fp and R. Since an increase in R, ceteris paribus, 
increases the money stock, which  is part of  W,  any increase in F will raise 
W by dF  independently of  the  split  between Fp and R. Thus the  central 
bank’s  intervention  policy  will  have  no  effect  on how  a  current  account 
balance moves F and W in (7). 
The effect of  an  increase  in  F  on F  in  (7) is  unclear;  dFldF  = Xw + 
7,  with  Xw < 0  and  7  > 0.  Below  we  will  conveniently  assume  that 
dFldF = 0; it will quickly become apparent why this is convenient. In Branson 
(1981), the case where dFldF < 0 is analyzed. 
Equations (1)-(7)  plus the assumption of rational expectations (or, more 
precisely, perfect  foresight in this nonstochastic  model)  give us a complete 
dynamic  model in  F  and  C.  Price dynamics are  suppressed, but  we  will 
discuss below exogenous price movements as delayed response to monetary 
shocks. 
F  = X(e/P, W,  z) + fF. 
2.2.4 Solution of the Model 
Solution of the model proceeds as follows. First, the rational expectations 
assumption is that C is the rate of change of e. Then two equations of  (1)- 
(3), with  wealth  substituted  from (4),  can be used  to solve for r and 2 as 
functions of M,  W,  eP.  The C and F equations then are two dynamic equa- 
tions in e and F that can be solved for the movement in these two variables. 
Divide  equations  (1)  and  (3) by  W  and  differentiate  totally, holding  f 
constant: 
d - = m,dr  + m,dC;  (3 
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These can be solved in matrix form as 
1 
(9) 
The solution for dC is then 
The coefficients  of ePIW and MIW  are the partial derivatives of  the  P  ad- 
justment function, 
This is  the dynamic equation  to be  solved  along  with  (7) for F  to obtain 
equilibrium e and P. 
In the e, Fp space of  figure 2.1, the C = 0 locus is a rectangular  hyper- 
bola.  This can be  seen by  observing that  in +, eFP enters multiplicatively 
(in W as well  as the numerator eFp),  so changes in e and Fp that hold the 
product eFp constant will  hold  C constant. Combinations of  e  and  Fp off 
the  locus move e  away from it, as the  arrows show. For example,  since 
+I > 0 an increase in e or Fp from a point on the locus makes P  > 0. 
An increase in MIW, holding eFPIW  constant, would shift the C = 0 locus 
in  figure  2.1  upward.  This would  be  the  result  of  an  expansionary  open 
market operation in  the government debt market with dB'  = dM > 0, and 
no change in R  or Fp. An  increase  in  eFPIW, holding MIW  constant, will 
shift e  = 0 downward; this could result from an open-market  swap between 
e 
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F  and B.  An expansionary  open-market operation in the foreign asset mar- 
ket, with the central bank altering reserves by exchanging M for F  with the 
private sector, would  shift 2 = 0 up both  by  increasing MIW  and reducing 
ePIW. This will provide the difference between intervention in  the bond or 
foreign asset markets in the model. 
For given values of z and P in  the F  equation (7),  the F  = 0 locus in e, 
P  space is a horizontal line at the e value where X  =  -7-F.  This is shown 
in figure 2.2. If  e is above this value, the current account is in surplus and 
F  > 0. In section 2.3 we will  introduce a  “leaning against the wind”  ex- 
change rate policy  in  which  the  authorities attempt to reduce the extent of 
jumps in the exchange rate but not to reverse them.  Thus we rule out here 
the  possibility  that  the  monetary  authority  overintervenes  and  assume  that 
the  sign of  Fp is the  same as the  sign of F;  this  is the  same as assuming 
I R  I  <  I F  I  .  This essentially  assumes  that  the  authorities  permit  the 
market  to  guide  the  system  toward  its  long-run  equilibrium,  but  perhaps 
slow the  movement.  The assumption  gives  the  arrows  showing movement 
in figure 2.2; above F  = 0, Fp > 0, below  it is negative. 
An increase  in  z  in  (7) will  shift the F  = 0 locus down. Given the  as- 
sumption that Xw + 7-  = 0, the extent of  the shift is simply given  by the 
effect of  a change in e on X:  &I  =  __  1 
dz  p=o  X,’ 
If  z  rises,  increasing  X  and  giving  a current  account  surplus,  e  must  fall 
(currency appreciate) enough to restore the original value of X.  An increase 
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Fig. 2.3  Equilibrium path for e, FP 
Equilibrium of the system is shown in figure 2.3.  There is one saddle path 
into the equilibrium shown by the dashed line. For a given value of Fp, it is 
assumed that following  a disturbance,  the  market will pick  the  value for e 
that  puts  the  system  on the  saddle  path  toward  equilibrium.  The system 
would have quite different properties under a policy regime of  overinterven- 
tion that reversed the pattern of  movement in the horizontal direction. 
2.2.5 Reaction to Exogenous Shocks 
Monetary Disturbance 
Consider  an (unanticipated)  expansionary  open-market  operation in gov- 
ernment  debt.  This  initially  leaves  W  and  Fp unchanged.  There  are  two 
extreme assumptions  on price  adjustment  to consider:  no change  in  P, or 
dPIP  = dMlM immediately. 
With no change in P as M increases,  the F  = 0 locus in figure 2.4 does 
not  shift, but  2  = 0 shifts upward.  With  Fp initially  given, the  exchange 
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new saddle path. This establishes C < 0 as needed for asset holders to hold 
the existing stock of P  given the lower interest rate. The rise in elP gener- 
ates a current account surplus, and Fp  rises with e falling toward E2.  This is 
an extreme form of  overshooting. 
Suppose the domestic price level immediately reacts by rising by the same 
proportion as the money stock. Then F  = 0 also shifts upward by that same 
proportion.  The extent of  the  upward  shift  in  C = 0 depends  on initial 
portfolio distribution and the degree of substitutability among F, M, and B. 
One borderline case would be M = eP  and rn,  = f,. It can be seen in the 
expression for dC  in equation (10) that in this case a proportional increase in 
e will maintain  C = 0. To the extent that M > eP  or  I fr  I  >  I m, I ,  the 
2 = 0 curve would shift upward  more than F  = 0, requiring overshooting 
and  2 < 0, Fp > 0 moving  to equilibrium.  The reverse  initial  conditions 
would yield undershooting with 2 > 0, Fp < 0 in  the movement to equilib- 
rium. 
Real Disturbance 
The effect  of an unanticipated  fall  in  z  (or an increase in P  is shown in 
figure 2.5. The decrease  in competitiveness  shifts F  = 0 upward  from  its 
initial  intersection  with  2 = 0 at Eo. The exchange  rate jumps  (currency 
depreciates)  from Eo to El and  then  gradually rises  to E2 as Fp falls.  The 
depreciation of the currency restores current account balance (b = 0).  The 
model undershoots in response to real disturbances. 
Sluggish Price Adjustment 
A limiting case of sluggish price adjustment could be modeled  as a com- 
bination of figures 2.4 and 2.5. Expansionary monetary  policy would begin 
this process illustrated in figure 2.4. The delayed price response would then 
resemble  figure  2.5. To the  extent  that  the  price  response  is  lagged  and 
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Fig. 2.6  Sluggish price adjustment 
Quicker  price  response  or  anticipation  would  straighten  the  path  to  E2, 
which  may be to the right or left of Eo depending on initial portfolio distri- 
bution and substitutability. 
2.2.6 Conclusions and Empirical Implications 
It is convenient to summarize here the basic conclusions from the analysis 
so far. 
1.  Unanticipated  changes  in  money,  the  price  level,  or  underlying  real 
conditions should cause a jump in the exchange rate toward the new rational 
expectations  saddle path. 
2.  Thus we should expect to see correlation between unanticipated move- 
ments in e and M,  X,  and P  in the data. Some initial evidence was presented 
in Branson (1981); more is presented below. 
3.  Movement  of the exchange rate following a real disturbance is likely 
to be  monotonic,  while  monetary  disturbances  are likely to produce  over- 
shooting. Lagged price adjustment makes “multiple  overshooting”  possible. 
This can be seen in a combination of figures 2.4 and 2.6. 
2.2.7  Interest Rate Control as an Alternative to Money Supply Control 
In interpreting the empirical results on exchange rate policy in section 2.5 
below,  it  will  be convenient  to have  a version  of  the  model  in  which  the 
monetary authority manipulates  its holdings of government debt in order to 
hit  an  interest  rate  target  and  uses  the  interest  rate  as the  instrument  of 
monetary policy.  Here we take r as exogenous, fixed by policy,  and permit 
BpIW and MIW to vary as necessary to hold r at its target value. 
To solve  the  model  under  a regime  of  interest  rate  control, we  make  r 
exogenous and MIW endogenous in equations (8) above, and then solve for 
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The interest rate simply replaces MIW  here. 
The C  = 0 locus is still a rectangular hyperbola in e, Fp space. A reduc- 
tion  in  r, implying an  increase  in MIW  and decrease  in BpIW, shifts the 
C  = 0 locus upward. Thus figure 2.4 provides a qualitative description of 
the effect of  a reduction of  the interest rate target in a regime of  monetary 
control.  The effects  of  movement  in  the  interest rate  on  the path  of  the 
exchange rate are clearly the same as the effects of the corresponding change 
in MIW  in the model with monetary control. 
2.3 “Leaning against the Wind”  as Exchange Rate Policy 
2.3.1  Introduction 
There is already ample evidence that monetary authorities have generally 
tried to slow the movement of exchange rates. This type of intervention has 
long been characteristic of United States domestic monetary policy; in Bran- 
son (1976) I labeled this “leaning  against the wind”  as exchange rate pol- 
icy. Artus (1976) and Branson, Halttunen, and Masson (BHM) (1977) pre- 
sented evidence that German monetary policy  responded to  movements in 
the exchange rate in this fashion. BHM (1977) estimated a reaction function 
of  the form AM  = aAe + . . . , with  (Y  < 0 for Germany. As the ex- 
change rate rose (DM depreciated), the money supply was reduced (relative 
to  its trend). Amano (1979) describes Japanese monetary policy as attempt- 
ing to stabilize the exchange rate similarly. United Kingdom exchange rate 
policy  was discussed briefly  in  OECD (1977), where  a regression of  the 
form Arm = pAe + .  . . , with r,,, the minimum lending rate (MLR) and 
p > 0 is reported. This suggests that when sterling depreciated (e rose), the 
MLR was increased as a policy reaction. More recently, Mussa (1981) has 
presented a thorough review of  exchange rate intervention which is consis- 
tent with a leaning-against-the-wind model. 
In this  section  I  shall  characterize policy  intervention in  terms  of  the 
model of  section 2.2., to prepare for interpretation of  the empirical results 
in section 2.5 below.  The objective is to describe policy,  not  evaluate it. 
The main difference from the previous models is the description of interven- 
tion  as instantaneous and discrete changes in asset stocks via open-market 
operations to reduce the size of discontinuous jumps in exchange rates. This 
type  of  policy  behavior is  discernible in  the  “innovation”  correlations in 
Section 2.5 below. 
I shall begin with the description of  monetary policy reaction to real dis- 
turbances via open-market operations in government debt or foreign assets. 
Then I will focus on sterilized intervention in the foreign asset market. 
2.3.2  Monetary Policy 
Consider a real disturbance to the current account that  shifts F  = 0 up 
(rise in e),  to restore equilibrium. This is illustrated in figure 2.7, where, in 90  William H. Branson 
\ 
Fig. 2.7  Monetary policy reaction 
the  absence of policy  intervention,  the exchange rate would jump from the 
initial equilibrium Eo to El and then  depreciate further to EZ.  If  the central 
bank  tightened  money  by  selling bonds  to the  public,  holding  Fp initially 
constant, the  C  = 0 curve in  figure 2.7 would shift downward as shown by 
the  dashed  2  = 0. This would  shift the  saddle path  downward  to the path 
running to E; and reduce the exchange rate jump to E;.  Thus instantaneous 
intervention  would  reduce  the  initial  jump in  e. This would  be  an  unex- 
pected change in M,  since the originating shift in z  and X  was unexpected. 
So this type of intervention could reduce the variability  of e over time. 
If  the  open-market  operation  were  done  in  the  foreign  asset  market,  a 
smaller quantitative  intervention would give the same shift in  C = 0 and in 
the  saddle path  in figure 2.7, because eFPiW in equation (8) would rise. In 
addition, since Fp would  rise,  the  initial jump would  be  to a point on the 
new  saddle path  below  E;.  Thus intervention  on the  foreign  asset  market 
would, in a sense, be more efficient than open-market operations in the bond 
market.  This  is  essentially  the  same  result  that  is  obtained  by  Branson 
(1977) and Kenen (1982) under static expectations. 
In a model with interest rate control, the same result as the bond  market 
open market  operation  of  figure  2.7  could  be  obtained  by  an  appropriate 
increase  in  the  interest  rate  target.  The necessary  increase  in  r  could  be 
reduced  by  performing  the  open-market  operation  in  the  foreign  asset 
market. 
2.3.3  Sterilized Intervention 
There is ample evidence that central  banks  intervene  in the  foreign  ex- 
change markets but attempt to prevent the intervention from changing the path 
of M.  The literature was cited in Whitman (1975); more recent results are dis- 
cussed in Obstfeld (1980, 1982). In terms of the model of section 2.3, this is 
an open-market exchange of foreign assets for bonds by the central bank, with 
AB” = -  eAFP  initially. The result is again a downward shift in C  = 0, as in 
figure 2.7, plus an outward shift in Fp.  Thus the jump in the exchange rate is to 91  Exchange Rate Policy after a Decade of  “Floating” 
a point below E;  ,  since Fp increases. This presents the possibility for interven- 
tion that does not move the path of the money supply. 
2.3.4 Monetary Disturbances 
Shifts in  asset demand functions or the  foreign  interest rate  would  shift 
the  2  = 0 locus, and the exchange rate  would  follow  a path  like that of 
figure 2.4, at least initially.  Either monetary or sterilized intervention could 
reduce the extent of the shift in i?  = 0, reducing the jump in e.  The central 
bank would  vary the supplies of the three assets to meet, at least partially, 
shifts in public demand for them. Again, this is a straightforward extension 
of  leaning-against-the-wind  policy  reaction  from the domestic to the inter- 
national markets. 
2.3.5 Empirical  Implications 
The principal  empirical implication  of  the present  model  of policy  inter- 
vention  is that we should  observe the intervention  in the correlation  of un- 
expected movements or “innovations”  in  exchange rates  with  innovations 
in money and/or reserves. Monetary intervention would give a negative cor- 
relation  between exchange rate and money  innovations.  Intervention  with 
interest rate control would give a positive correlation between exchange rate 
and  interest  rate  innovations.  If  the  monetary  intervention  is done in  the 
foreign asset market, a positive  correlation  between  exchange rate  innova- 
tions and reserves  would  result.  Sterilized  intervention  would  give the re- 
serve exchange rate correlation  without a money exchange rate correlation. 
Thus we can study the correlation  matrix of innovations  in  section 2.5. be- 
low to infer hypotheses about policy behavior. 
2.4  The Data 
2.4.1 Introduction 
The asset market model  of  section 2.2 implies that  unanticipated  exoge- 
nous movements in the money  stock, the current account balance, and rela- 
tive price levels  will cause unanticipated  jumps in  the  exchange rate.  The 
intervention  model  of  section  2.3 implies  that  unanticipated  jumps  in  ex- 
change rates can cause unanticipated  changes in the money stock, reserves, 
or interest  rates. Thus innovations  in  money  or  interest  rates  may  have a 
positive  or negative  correlation  with  innovations  in  exchange rates.  If  the 
correlation  is negative,  the inferred hypothesis would be that the underlying 
model  is a monetary  reaction  function. A  negative  correlation  between  re- 
serve and exchange rate innovations would  indicate exchange market inter- 
vention.  In  this  and  the  following section  of  the paper,  we  see that  the 
quarterly data for the United States, Germany, Japan, and the United  King- 
dom can  be  interpreted  within  this  framework.  We  are inferring  testable 
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In this  section  and the next, we study relationships  of  movements  in the 
exchange rate of  each country, measured  by the effective exchange rate as 
defined by the IMF, with movements in money stocks, current account bal- 
ances,  relative  prices,  reserves,  and  interest  rates.  The purpose  is  to  see 
what policy  stance is implied  by the data. The data are described  in detail 
in table 2.1. 
Table 2.1  Variable Definitions and Data 
1.  Variable Name 
e  = effective nominal exchange rate, in  units of foreign currency per unit of home 
currency as computed by  the IMF. Note that this definition is the inverse of e  in 
sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
PiF  = relative wholesale prices (ratio of home to competitors indices. 
M1  = narrow money, as defined by  the IMF in  the International Financial Statistics 
M3 = broad money,  as defined by the IMF (MI plus quasi-money) in the IFS. 
(IFS)  . 
CAB  = current account balance. 
IS  = short-term interest rate, from IFS. 
R  = reserves, from IFS. 
11.  Countries 
United States 
United Kingdom 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Japan 
111.  Data 
1.  All data are quarterly, from IMF sources (in most causes from IFS) and cover 
1973:IV-I980:IV. 
2.  Exchange rates: e, is the log of the average effective exchange rate during quarter t. 
The units are foreign currency per unit of domestic currency. The index is  based on a 
geometrically weighted average of bilateral rates between the home and  13 other 
industrial countries. The weights are the same as those used to calculate PlP. Base: 
1975 = 100. Source: IMF. Note that these are not the MERM rates published in IFS. 
3. Relative prices: The index is a log of the ratio of  home to foreign quarterly wholesale 
price indices. P is a composite and uses the same weights as does e (see above). Base = 
1975. Source: IMF. This index is not the same as that published in the IFS. Our data 
is based on indices in local (not a common) currency. 
4. Money: This is the log of the end of  the quarter money stock. Source: IFS, line 34 
(“money”)  for MI, lines 34 and 35 (“money”  + “quasi-money”)  for M3. 
5. Current account: This is the dollar value of the flow during the quarter (not measured 
in logs). Source: IFS, lines: 77aa (Merchandise: Exports, fob); 77ab (Merchandises: 
Imports, fob); 77ac (Other Goods, Services, and Income: Credits); 77ad (Other 
Goods, Services,  and Income: Debits); 77ae (Private Unrequited Transfers); 77ag 
(Official Unrequited Transfers). 
6. Short-term interest rate: Data are taken from IFS as indicated in  the Table on 
“Money Market and Euro Dollar Rates.”  Source: IFS country pages: United States 
and United Kingdom, line 6Oc; Germany and Japan, line 60b. 
7.  Reserves: These are the dollar value of reserves measured at end of  period. Source 
IFS line 1d.d. These series did not vary significantly from the series adjusted for 
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The first step in analyzing the data is to investigate their time series prop- 
erties.  This  provides  a compact description of  the  “facts”  and  an  initial 
indication of  whether the facts are roughly consistent with the theory. The 
time series analysis of  the data is done in this section. Then in section 2.5 
we study systems of vector autoregressions, one for each country, to test the 
relations between unanticipated changes, or “innovations,”  in the variables. 
2.4.2 Time Series Analysis 
by  regression equations of  the form 
In this section the autoregressive structure of each time series is described 
where X, is the log of  the time series under consideration, XrPi  is its value 
lagged  i quarters, Di  is a seasonal dummy, and t is time. Equation (12) is a 
univariate autoregression of the variable X  on its own past values, and the 
estimated values of  the a coefficients give the pattern of  response of  the 
time series to a disturbance u,.  The two cases that will appear prominently 
in our data are first-order autoregression, where only aI  is significant, and 
second-order autoregression, where a1  and  ci2 are significant. One purpose 
of the analysis is simply to describe the data; the second is to see if the time 
series structure of the exchange rate data is consistent with that of the other 
data. 
For each variable we began with a regression on four lags, seasonal dum- 
mies, and a time trend. We then shortened the lags by  eliminating insignif- 
icant variables at the far end of the lag. The results are shown in tables 2.2- 
2.5,  one for each country. Each column in the tables shows the results of a 
regression of  the indicated variable on lagged values of  itself. Coefficients 
of  the time trend and seasonal dummies are not shown. The regressions are 
performed on quarterly data for the period  1973-IV  to 1980-IV.  The begin- 
ning date was chosen because it was after the major period of disequilibrium 
adjustment in  1971-73,  including a major real  devaluation of  the  United 
States dollar,  and  the  last  date was  the  most  recent  for which  data  were 
available when we  began the study in June 198 1. The regressions were run 
using the logs of exchange rates, relative prices, and money, and the levels 
of  the current account balance, interest rates, and reserves. The current ac- 
count and reserves are both time series that pass through zero in some cases. 
2.4.3 Country Results 
United States 
The results for the United States are instructive and serve as an illustration 
of the technique. In the first two columns of table 2.2, we show the regres- 
sions for the  log of  the  United  States nominal  effective exchange rate  e, Table 2.2  United States Univariate Autoregressions (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Time Series 
e  PIF  MI  M3  CAB  IS  R 
Lags: 
t-  1  .86*  .78* 
(.21)  (.lo) 
r-2  .24  - 
(.  29) 
r-3  .37  - 
(.28) 
t-4  p.24  - 
~19) 
Statistics: 
R2  .86  .85 
SE  ,027  ,026 







.33  0.55* 
(.24)  (.I@ 
.31  - 
~27) 
-.I6  - 
(.29) 
.22  - 
~24) 
.99  .99 
1.57  1.96 
.012  ,012 
.70*  .78* 
(.24)  (.14) 
.33  - 
-.22  - 
-.08  - 
~27) 
~30) 
(  .24) 
.99  .99 
1.98  2.15 
,009  .008 
.92*  .80* 
(.21)  (.14) 
-  p.19  - 
.13  - 
(.30) 
p.20  - 
(  ,221 
~30) 
.76  .74 
1.86  1.66 
1.96  1.91 
1.21*  .82*  .82* 
(.17)  (.24)  (.12) 
1.19*  .OO  - 
1.49*  -  - 
(.  30) 
-.65*  -  - 
(26)  (24) 
~25) 
.92  .79  .79 
2.24  1.68  1.68 









~__~____  ~~  ~~~~ 
Notes:  (I) Sample period: 1973:IV-I98O:IV for dependent variable. 
(2) All regressions  include constant, seasonal dummies, and time trend 
(3) An * indicates the coefficient is significant at the?%  level. 
(4) Source for all data is IMF (but e is not merm, PIP is WPI). 95  Exchange Rate Policy after a Decade of  “Floating” 
weighted by the IMF, in foreign currency per dollar. The first column shows 
the regression  with four lags on the exchange rate; only the lag at t - 1 is 
significant with a coefficient of  .86. When the lags at t - 2 through t -  4 
are eliminated, the  standard error of the estimated equation falls a bit, and 
the coefficient of e,-  is .78. Thus the United States effective rate, measured 
as a quarterly average, can be described as a stable first-order autoregression 
(ARl). The coefficient of  .78 on e,-l indicates that a given  disturbance u, 
will eventually  disappear  from  the time  series as its effect is given  by  in- 
creasing powers of  .78: e, = .78 u,; 
The third and fourth columns of  table 2.2 show the results for the log of 
the  United  States relative  price  index Pip. This  is an  index of  the  United 
States WPI relative to a weighted average of the WPIs of  13 other industrial 
countries. The variable Piep is the IMF’s measure of relative cost, published 
in the International Financial Statistics. It is the inverse of the real exchange 
rate of section 2.2. 
The first regression  for PIP  in table  2.2 gives  significant  coefficients  to 
the  lags at t - 1 and t - 2. Elimination  of the longer lags results  in the 
second equation, with a standard error only slightly larger than the first. The 
result for Pip is a second-order autoregression (AR2), with a stable cyclical 
response to a di~trubance.~ 
The next two pairs of columns in table 2.2  show the univariate autoregres- 
sion results for the two United States money stocks.  In both cases only the 
lag at t - 1 is significant. Both are stable first-order autocorrelations. 
The next two columns  in table 2.2 show the autoregressions for the cur- 
rent account balance. These are run on the level of CAB, rather than its log, 
since the time series passes through zero. The result is similar to that for the 
money stocks. 
The next  three  columns  in  table  2.2 show  the  autoregressions  for  the 
United States short-term interest rate. All four lag coefficients are significant 
in  the  first column. In the  second  regression,  with just lags  at r  - 1  and 
t -  2, the second is completely insignificant.  Beyond t - 1, the important 
lags are at t - 3 and t - 4. The last of the three regressions includes only 
the  lag  at t -  1;  the  standard  error is  clearly  higher  than  in  the  four-lag 
regression.  Rather than include in the VAR system for the United  States in 
section  2.5 four  (or more)  lags on  the  interest  rate,  which  would  greatly 
reduce degrees of freedom, I decided to include only the lag at t - 1. The 
last  two columns  of  table  2.2 show the  regressions  for United  States  re- 
serves. Only the lag at t - 1  is significant, giving a stable first-order auto- 
regression. 
In the case of  the United  States, then, money  stocks, the balance on cur- 
rent  account, reserves, and  the  nominal  effective  exchange  rate  all  follow 
= .78’  u,,  and so on. 
3. The characteristic equation is given b~ 
PIP, - 1.36 PIP,-, + 0.60  = 0. 
The roots of  this equation are  .68 +  .37i, with a modulus of  0.77 = 0.6”’. 96  William H. Branson 
stable AR1 processes.  This suggests that the behavior of money stocks, the 
current account  balance,  reserves,  and  the exchange rate  are consistent,  at 
this level, with the theoretical model of  sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
The relationships  between  interest  rates  and  relative  prices  and  the  ex- 
change  rate  is  more  complicated. With  relative  prices  following  an  AR2, 
there is at best a loose relationship to the exchange rate. This is consistent 
with  the  evidence  of  high  variability  in purchasing  power  parity  (PPP) in 
Frenkel  (1981). The higher-order process for the  interest  rate suggests that 
it is being moved by all the exogenous variables simultaneously rather than 
reacting systematically to, or causing directly, the exchange rate. 
West Germany 
Table 2.3 shows the univariate  autoregression results  for Germany. The 
format is exactly the same as for the United States, so the discussion can be 
brief. 
As  in  the  United  States  case,  the  nominal  effective  rate,  the  money 
stocks, and the balance on current account all follow ARl processes in Ger- 
many.  All  but  M3 are  stable.  German  M3 has  a  lag  coefficient  of  unity, 
indicating that it is a “random walk”:  the change in M3 is (roughly) white 
noise.  The German  relative  price  series is AR2 with  a  stable cyclical  re- 
sponse to  disturbance^.^ The German interest rate is AR1 with a lag coeffi- 
cient close to unity. Reserves have a barely significant lag at t - 3 but can 
be  approximated  by  a  stable ARl. Thus  the  impression  from the  German 
data is similar to the United  States, except for the additional possibility  that 
the interest rate is used as a policy instrument to control movements in  the 
exchange rate. 
United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom results are summarized in table 2.4. Both the nom- 
inal  effective  rate  and the M1  money  stock  in  the  United  Kingdom  have 
coefficients of unity on the t - 1 lag, indicating that they follow a random 
walk. The relative price series is AR2, as in the United States and Germany, 
but with a stable monotonic adjustment response to disturbances. 
In the first regression for the current account balance, there are no signif- 
icant lag terms.  Thus the United Kingdom CAB is best described as random 
around  the path  described  by  the  trend  and  seasonal  dummy terms.  This 
suggests that the innovations in the CAB in the United Kingdom should not 
be  interpreted as conveying information about future movements in the ex- 
change rate.5 
4Note that  the German  price  equation  would not  invert due to  multicolinearity  with  more 
than two lags. 
5A moving  average  specification of  the  equation  for  the  United  Kingdom  CAB  was  also 
experimented  with,  with  no improvement in results. The United Kingdom CAB does seem to 
be random about its trend. Table 2.3  Germany Univariate Autoregressions 
e  PIP  MI  M3  CAB  IS  R 
Lags: 





























.99  .82 
1.73  1.64 
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“With more than two lags, the autoregression for PIP would not invert due to collinearity Table 2.4  United Kingdom Univariate Autoregressinns 
e  PIF  M1  M3  CAB  IS  R 
Lags: 
t- 1  I.  10* 
(.22) 
t-2  .01 
r-3  -.02 
t-4  -  .I0 
Statistics: 
RZ  .94 
D-W  1.70 
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Both the interest rate and reserves in the United Kingdom follow second- 
order autoregressions, with  stable cyclical responses to disturbances. This 
would be consistent with interest rate policy being used to control reserves. 
Japan 
The results for Japan are summarized in table 2.5. There we  see major 
differences from the other three countries. The nominal effective exchange 
rate, the relative price series, the current account balance, and the interest 
rate  are  all  AR2  with  stable cyclical  response patterns.  The  two  money 
stocks are ARl  with  unitary  lag  coefficients. Reserves in Japan follow a 
complex autoregression of at least the fourth degree. Comparison of  the first 
two reserve regressions in table 2.5 shows the importance of the lag at t - 
4. To conserve degrees of  freedom in the Japanese VAR system reported in 
section 2.5, I used the first-order approximation.6 Thus in the Japanese case 
the time series behavior of  the exchange rate is consistent with that of  rela- 
tive prices, the current account, and the interest rates, but the exchange rate 
does not follow the random walk pattern of money. 
2.4.4  Summary on the Data 
The  univariate  autoregressions of  tables  2.2-2.5  provide  a  useful  and 
compact description of the “facts.”  Comparing the country results, we  see 
several common points. 
1.  All  weighted  relative  price  series  are  second-order  autoregressions 
with stable responses to shocks. All but the United Kingdom series are cy- 
clical. 
2.  All the money stocks are first-order autoregressions, many with unitary 
lag coefficients. 
3. The United States and German exchange rate and current account se- 
ries are first-order autoregressions and the Japanese are second-order. Thus 
these  movements  in  exchange rate  are  consistent with  movements  in  the 
current account balance, while the United Kingdom CAB contains no infor- 
mation about its future path. 
4. The United States and German exchange rate and reserves follow AR1 
processes that could reflect intervention. The United Kingdom and Japanese 
interest rates and exchange rates follow consistent processes, AR1 and AR2, 
respectively. 
2.5  Empirical Results Using Vector Autoregression 
2.5.1 Introduction 
A useful technique for studying the relationships among the innovations 
in money, the current account balance, relative price levels, interest rates, 
?he  Japanese VAR results were reestimated using a 4-quarter lag on reserves, without much 
change. Table 2.5  Japan Univariate Autoregressions 
e  PIP  MI  M3  CAB  IS  R 
Lags: 





t-2  -.31 
2-3  .12 
1-4  -.26 
Statistics: 
R2  .91 
D-W  1.14 
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reserves,  and the exchange rate is vector autoregression (VAR).  Here each 
variable of  a system is regressed  against the  lagged values of  all variables 
(including  itself)  in  the system,  to  extract any information  existing  in  the 
movements of these variables. The residuals from these “vector autoregres- 
sions” are the innovations-the  unanticipated  movements-in  the variables. 
We can study the correlations  of the residuals to see if  they  are consistent 
with  the  hypotheses  implied  by  the  theory  of  sections  2.2 and  2.3.  The 
vector autoregression technique  is introduced and justified by Sims (1980). 
A clear exposition is presented in Sargent (1979). Interesting and instructive 
applications  are  discussed  in  Taylor  (1980), Ashenfelter  and  Card  (1981), 
and Fischer (1981). 
Here  I  estimate  systems of  VARs  for each  of  the  four  countries,  the 
United  States,  the  United  Kingdom,  Germany,  and  Japan.  Two systems 
were estimated for each country.  Both include the effective exchange rate e, 
the current  account balance  CAB, and the effective relative price PlF, the 
interest  rate IS, and reserves R; the difference between the two is that one 
included M1 and the other M3. An obvious extension of the research would 
be to include  cross-country  effects, particularly  of  money  stocks,  but  also 
the other variables. The difficulty in proceeding in this direction comes from 
the limited number of quarterly observations: 29 from  1973-IV to  1980-IV. 
Each VAR includes lagged values of four variables,  a time trend,  and three 
seasonal dummies. In order to expand the analysis,  I  am presently  moving 
to a monthly data base. 
Before estimating the VARs, one must consider the issue of the timing of 
the data. The effective exchange rate can be  computed  from public  infor- 
mation  on  a daily  basis.  In  fact, a United  Kingdom  effective rate  is pub- 
lished  daily  in  the  Financial  Times.  Our  data  are  averages  during  the 
quarter. The effective rate used here is the inverse of e as defined in sections 
2.2 and 2.3. Money stock data are available on a weekly basis,  so they are 
roughly  contemporaneous  with  the  exchange  rate  data.  We  use  end-of- 
period  money  data.  We  would  expect  from  Section  11  that  the  weekly 
changes in M would generate nearly simultaneous movements in e. Thus the 
innovation of the average e over a quarter would be most closely connected 
in  our data with the innovation of the end-of-quarter money stock, which is 
the cumulation  of the  weekly  innovations.  Reserves are also end-of-period 
data, so that intervention to slow an unanticipated jump in  e would  appear 
as an innovation in reserves. 
The relative price data are quarterly averages of  monthly data, which be- 
come known soon after the month ends. Thus in our data set, the innovation 
in  e, would  be most  closely  connected  to  the  innovation  in  P/F,. Interest 
rates  are also quarterly  averages, so that  if  the  interest  rate  were  used  to 
control  the exchange rate  we would  see a correlation  between  the innova- 
tions in e, and in IS,. 
On the other hand, the data on the  quarterly balance on current account 102  William H. Branson 
Table 2.6  Variables Included in Vector Autoregression Systems 
United States, Germany  United Kingdom  Japan 
In  e,-l 
In M,-, 
In  PIP,-  I 




In  e,- I 
In 
InM,  I 
In  PIP,- 




1st  -  2 
Rt- I 
Note: Two VAR  systems  were estimated  for each country, one with  M1, one with M3. The 
equations are estimated on data  1973 IV-1980  IV (described in table 2.1). 
are not announced until well  into the following quarter. Thus to the extent 
that the innovation in CAB signals a change in the equilibrium real exchange 
rate, it is the innovation in CAB,-I  that moves e,. 
The  VAR  residuals to  be  correlated,  then,  are those of  e,, M,, (Pip),, 
CABrpI,  IS,,  and  R,. We  will  use  a tilde  to designate residuals from the 
VARs. The variables in each VAR  system are listed in table 2.6.  The num- 
ber of lags included in each variable was determined by  the univariate au- 
toregression of tables 2.2-2.5.  This constraint provides a convenient way  to 
limit the number of regressors and conserve degrees of freedom. A next step 
in research would be to reestimate the VAR systems with additional lags to 
see how much information is lost by application of this constraint. 
After the VAR systems are estimated, we correlate their residuals to study 
the relationship among innovations. The correlations are given for the sys- 
tems with M1 and M3 in tables 2.7-2.14  below, two for each country. Each 
table includes the correlation coefficients among the VAR  innovations and 
in  parentheses the probability of  that  correlation occurring under the  null 
hypothesis that the true correlation is zero. 
In  discussing the correlations, we  will  focus on the correlations particu- 
larly relevant for analyzing exchange rate determination and policy. Detailed 
discussion of  all the results would be far too tedious. 
2.5.2  United States 
The correlations of VAR  innovations for the United  States are shown in 
tables 2.7 and 2.8. Remember that here the effective nominal exchange rate 
is defined in units of  foreign exchange per unit of  home currency, the in- 
verse  of  the theoretical definition of  sections 2.2 and 2.3.  So here  an  in- 
crease in e is an appreciation. 
The first rows of table 2.7 and 2.8 give the correlations of  exchange rate 
innovations. The negative signs for relative prices and money are consistent 103  Exchange Rate Policy after a Decade of  “Floating” 
Table 2.7  Correlations of Innovations from United States Vector 
Autoregression System with M1 
8  MI  PIB  CAB  is  R 
P  I .oo  -  .30  -  .42 
(.11)  ~03) 
MI  I .oo  -  .35 
(.06) 
PIP  1 .oo 
CAB 
R 
“An entry of  .OO indicates the number was less than  .005 
with innovations in those variables driving e, as in the model of  section 2.2. 
There is a weak correlation with reserves, consistent with  intervention. In- 
novations in reserves, shown in the last columns of tables 2.7 and 2.8, are 
positively correlated with innovations in CAB,  but not in money. It is useful 
here to recall that the CAB  is lagged one period, so that the correlation is 
between the residual CAB,-  I  and R,. Thus the indication in  tables 2.7 and 
2.8 is that  intervention comes at the point where the CAB  announcement 
would move the exchange rate,  not during the period  in which  the actual 
CAB  occurs. 
The underlying vector autoregression for e (not shown here) also shows a 
strong Granger-causal role  for lagged  CAB.  Thus the hypothesis I  would 
infer from the United States data is as follows. The current account, money, 
and relative prices all move the exchange rate, the latter two through market 
Table 2.8  Correlation of Innovations from United States Vector 
Autoregression System with M3 
~ 
P  M3  PlF  CAB  IS  R 
P  1 .oo  -  .48  -  .37 
M3  1 .oo  .23 
(.24) 
PIP  I .oo 
(.01)  (.05) 
CAB 
is 
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expectations and innovations. Monetary policy is essentially oriented toward 
domestic targets; movement in the exchange rate is a side effect. The United 
States monetary authorities intervene and sterilize, but do not follow a tight 
rule.  This  shows up  in the  strong correlation be  R  and  CAB, and  in the 
correlation between R and t. 
2.5.3  Germany 
The  innovation correlations for  Germany are  shown  in  tables 2.9 and 
2.10. In  the first row of both tables we see a very strong negative correlation 
between exchange rate and relative price innovations. This could come from 
exchange rates  causing prices or vice  versa,  but  through  innovations and 
market expectations rather than a tight PPP relationship. The correlations of 
exchange rate innovations with short-term interest rates and reserves (in the 
Table 2.9  Correlation of Innovations from German Vector Autoregression 
System with MI 
P  M1  PIP  CAB  Is  R 
P  I .oo  .17  -  .44  .27  -  .48  .40 
(.37)  (-02)  (. 15)  (.W 
MI  1 .oo  .02  .25  -  .47  .28 
i.94)  ~19)  (.01)  (.  14) 
PIP  1 .oo  .23  .07  .28 
(.22)  (.73)  (. 14) 
CAB  1 .oo  -  .33  .43 
(.O8)  (32) 
(.49) 
R  I .oo 
rs  1  .oo  -.I3 
Table 2.10  Correlation of  Innovations from German Vector Autoregression 
System with M3 
e  M3  PIF  CAB  18  R 
e  1 .oo  -  .09  -  .59  .03 
(.63  (.oo)  (.  90) 
M3  1 .oo  .18  .20 
i.34)  (.30) 
PIP  1  .oo  .25 
i  .20) 
CAB  I .oo 
rs 
-  .52 
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M1  system) must  reflect  leaning-against-the-wind policy  in  terms  of  both 
interest rates and intervention. The negative correlation of  the interest rate 
and CAB innovations suggests that interest rate policy may respond to the 
state of  the CAB as well as to the exchange rate.  The lack of correlation 
between money and reserves or exchange rates indicates sterilized interven- 
tion.  The  correlation  between  CAB  and  R  also  supports the  intervention 
hypothesis. 
Thus the German data suggest fairly strongly a situation in which (1) price 
and exchange rate innovations go together, and (2) the authorities react to 
exchange rate and current  account movements through  changes in  interest 
rates and sterilized intervention. This is consistent with the earlier results of 
BHM (1977) and of Herring and Marston (1977) for the fixed rate regime. 
2.5.4 United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom correlations are shown in tables 2.11 and 2.12. The 
exchange rate correlations with interest rates and reserves are a strong indi- 
cation of  leaning-against-the-wind intervention and interest rate policy. This 
effects M1 but not M3, as can be seen in the correlations of &f  with  E  and 
R. Innovations in the current account balance have the positive correlation 
with e that would come from the theory of section 2.2. Perhaps this suggests 
that while from the univariate autoregressions of  section 2.4, CAB innova- 
tions have no predictive content, the market thinks they do. 
In  both  tables there  is a  strong  negative correlation between the  CAB 
innovation and the interest rate. This would be consistent with interest rate 
policy determined by  CAB as well as the exchange rate, similar to the Ger- 
man case. The United Kingdom data thus show influence of CAB on e, with 
interest rate and intervention policy  reacting to  innovations in e  and  CAB 
with M1 unsterilized. 
Table 2.11  Correlations of Innovations from United Kingdom Vector 
Autoregression System with M1 
~  ~_____ 
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Table 2.12  Correlations of  Innovations from United Kingdom Vector 
Autoregression System with M3 
e  M3  PIP  CAB  IS  R 
P  I .oo  -  .04  -  .04  .47  -  .55  .44 
(.82)  (35)  (.OI)  (.OO)  (42) 
M3  1  .oo  .05  .46  -  .30  -  .I5 
(  ,791  (.OJ)  (.lo)  (.43) 
(.80)  (.81)  (35) 
CAB  I .oo  -  .61  .08 
(.67) 
I3  I .oo  -  .27 
R  I .oo 
PiF  1 .oo  .05  -  .05  -  .04 
2.5.5 Japan 
The results for Japan are shown in tables 2.13 and 2.14. Let us  focus on 
table 2.13 first. The correlation of  innovations in the exchange and interest 
rates suggests a system of interest rate control with policy targets other than 
the exchange rate, rather than the reaction to exchange rates as found in the 
United  Kingdom  and Germany.  The correlations  of  the  interest  rate  with 
relative prices and the CAB suggest that these might be the targets. 
The reserve correlations with the exchange rate and CAB strongly suggest 
leaning-against-the-wind intervention, with the central bank absorbing part of 
the CAB innovations to reduce movement  in the exchange rate. The lack of 
correlation of  Ml with reserves or the exchange rate indicates sterilization. 
An interesting picture emerges from the Japanese correlations. They sug- 
Table 2.13  Correlations of Innovations from Japan Vector Autoregression 
System with MI 
i  MI  PIP  CAB  I3  R 
~  ___~ 
e  I .oo  -  .06 
(.77) 
MI  1 .oo 
CAB 
rS 
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Table 2.14  Correlations of Innovations from Japan Vector Autoregression 
System with M3 
P  M3  PIP  CAB  Is  R 
P  I .oo  .  00 
(.9@ 




gest that policy sets interest rates with CAB and PIP among the objectives. 
The interest rate moves the exchange rate, as in section 2.2, and the author- 
ities  intervene to,  in  a  sense, neutralize  this  effect. They also attempt  to 
sterilize M1  from all of this. The VAR  system  with  M3 is consistent  with 
this  picture  in  terms  of  signs of  correlations, although  significance  levels 
vary  from  the  M1  system  (in  both  directions-see  the  correlation  of  IS 
and CAB). 
2.5.6  Summary of VAR Results on Policy 
An  interesting  view  of  how  the  monetary  system  and  interdependence 
have worked  in the  1970s emerges from the  VAR innovation  correlations. 
My interpretation, or inferred  set of  hypotheses, is as follows. The United 
States sets monetary policy, largely by controlling quantities, with domestic 
objectives most  in  mind.  The market  looks  to innovations  in  money  and 
relative prices,  and levels of  the current account balance, to set the United 
States exchange rate. The monetary authority attempts sterilized intervention 
occasionally. In Japan, interest rates are set with relative prices (or rates of 
inflation) and the current account balance among the leading objectives.  In- 
terest  rate  innovations move  the exchange rate, but  an attempt is made to 
neutralize this effect through sterilized intervention. 
Movement in the United States and Japanese effective rates, caused partly 
by  fundamentals and partly  by  policy, are  mirrored  instantaneously  in  the 
United  Kingdom and German effective rates,  and  their  policy  reacts.  The 
reaction  appears as  “defensive”  interest  rate  movements  sensitive  to ex- 
change rate and CAB innovations, and largely sterilized intervention  in the 
foreign exchange market.  Thus a consistent story in which domestically ori- 
ented policy  in  the  United  States and  Japan  is  transmitted  in  the  United 
Kingdom and Germany is consistent with the VAR innovation results. 
One final issue appears in the relations among exchange rate and interest 108  William H. Branson 
rate innovations. The correlation in the United States is negligible, while in 
the United Kingdom and Germany it is strongly negative. An  implication is 
that innovations in the dollar prices of the deutsche mark and sterling should 
be  negatively correlated with  innovations in  the United States-German  and 
United  States-United  Kingdom  interest differentials,  as  noted  by  Frenkel 
(1981). The hypothesis advanced there was that nominal interest rates and 
exchange rates were both  reacting to changes in  inflation rates. The alter- 
native hypothesis provided here is that United Kingdom and German interest 
rate innovations are policy reactions. 
COmmeIlt  Willem H. Buiter 
This interesting paper develops a theoretical open economy model that sug- 
gests  certain  associations between  innovations in  the  exchange  rate,  the 
money stock,  the current account, relative price levels,  interest rates,  and 
international reserves. The empirical part of  the paper studies these correla- 
tions between innovations for the United States, the United Kingdom, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan. 1 shall discuss the theoretical and 
empirical sections in turn. 
The Theoretical Model 
The paper develops a model of  a single open economy. The country is 
specialized in the production of  its exportable and has  some market power 
in the world market for the exportable. It consumes both its exportable good 
and  an  import whose  world price in  foreign currency is  given.  There are 
perfect international financial markets in  the sense that instantaneous stock- 
shift portfolio reshuffles between domestic and foreign assets are possible. 
Domestic and foreign bonds are, however, imperfect substitutes. The inter- 
est rate on the foreign bond  is exogenous. Exchange rate expectations are 
rational. Assumptions about price-level flexibility range from a fixed domes- 
tic  currency price of  the  exportable to  a freely flexible exportables price. 
External wealth adjustment through current account deficits and surpluses is 
allowed for. The model can be viewed as a flexible exchange rate version 
of  Obstfeld (1980) or an imperfect asset substitutability version of Branson 
and Buiter (1983). 
The decision to  conduct the  analysis conditional on  the level of  output 
and thus to avoid the need to consider the goods market or IS equilibrium 
condition certainly has expository advantages. However, the empirical ob- 
servations have presumably been  generated by  a complete model in  which 
output  is  endogenous.  To  infer  what  kinds  of  correlations between  real 
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would have to be  endogenized.  If  output or income is an  argument in the 
money demand function, some of the predictions of  the complete model are 
likely to be different from those of the asset markets model,  at any rate as 
regards the fixed and sluggish price adjustment versions. 
The monotonic  movement  of  the  exchange rate  following  a real  distur- 
bance holds true, even in the fixed price and perfectly flexible price versions 
of  the  model,  only  for  unanticipated  permanent  disturbances.  Anticipated 
future shocks  are likely  to give rise to nonmonotonic  adjustment patterns. 
With lagged price adjustment the adjustment process is likely to be cyclical, 
even  in  response  to unanticipated  shocks.  If,  for  example, sluggish  price 
P  adjustment  is  modeled  by  - = +(y  -  J) + IT, T  = 
P 
where  y  is  real  output, J  is  capacity  output,  and  T is  core  inflation  (4, 
-q > 0), a cyclical adjustment process is virtually  guaranteed.  Adding slug- 
gish price adjustment  increases the dimensionality  of  the  state vector by  at 
least one. The example just given adds two state variables. 
The implicit assumption is made throughout,  that Fp and  W are positive. 
From  equation  (1  1) we  find that  the  1.  = 0 locus  can be  given  by  either 
branch  of  the  rectangular  hyperbola  in  figure 2.C.1 depending  on whether 
the stationary  value of  F  is positive or negative.  (It is assumed that  while 
Fp can be negative as well as positive,  W is positive throughout.) 
Assuming  with  Branson  that  the Fp = 0 locus  is  horizontal,  the  phase 
diagram is as figure 2.C. 1. If there is a unique stationary solution for W and 
the  domestic  interest  rate  I, then  there  is a unique  solution  for Fp. If  this 
\ 
- -0-  + 
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solution is negative we  are at  E,;  if  it is positive El will be the stationary 
equilibrium. 
The qualitative response  of  e and  Fp to an  unanticipated  increase in M 
will be the same, whether the stationary equilibrium is at Eo or El.  From an 
initial position at Eo, the e  = 0 locus shifts down and to  the right when  M 
increases.  There  is  a  new  long-run  equilibrium  at  E,’,  say,  and  a  new 
convergent  saddle  path  solsor through  Ear.  The  exchange  rate  “jump- 
depreciates”  to B and then gradually appreciates toward E,’  along so’so’. 
Most of  the results in the theoretical part of the paper do not require the 
assumption of  imperfect asset substitutability. The distinction between open 
market operations in domestic bonds and open market operations in foreign 
bonds would of  course disappear if  the two bonds were perfect substitutes. 
The Empirical Work 
The  data  analysis  starts  by  estimating  univariate  autoregressions  for 
money  stocks,  current account balances, effective exchange rates,  relative 
prices, and interest rates. For the United States, the money supply, the cur- 
rent account balance, reserves, and the nominal exchange rate are found to 
follow stable ARl processes. Branson argues that this suggests the behavior 
of these variables is “consistent,  at this level, with the theoretical model of 
sections 2.2 and  2.3.”  However, the theoretical  model only suggests that 
the innovations should be correlated. Consider, for illustrative purposes, the 
following structural model. 
(14  m, = alm,-l + €7, 
(1b)  et  = Plet-1  +  P2er-2  + Per-3  + P4[mr -  E(mr IIt-l)I 
+ EPt. 
In  this equation, €7 and  E:  are white noise disturbances. Clearly the inno- 
vation  in the  univariate autogression for m,, €7 and  the innovation in  the 
univariate autogression for el,  E:  +  P4e7, are correlated even  if €7 and  Ey 
are independently distributed. Yet m, will follow an AR1 process and  el  an 
AR3 process. Conversely, even if m, and e, were each to follow “similar” 
ARl  processes,  this by  itself can  tell us  nothing  about the correlation be- 
tween the innovations in the two processes. That issue can only be  settled 
by  estimating a bivariate ARIMA process for mr and e,. 
I  am  also unconvinced of  thc validity  of  the criterion for selecting the 
number of  lags to be included in the vector autogressions. In the paper, the 
number of  lags included for each variable was determined by  the univariate 
autogressions. Assume for purposes of  illustration that  el  and m, follow  a 
first-order vector autogressive process: 
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(2b) 
Repeated  substitution  in (2b)  yields  m, =  PI  +  P\E?-,. 
m, = Pler-l + P2ml-l + e?. 
cc  3c 
r=O  r=O 
That is,  a 
(34  e, = a1er-1  + 4%  c  P;e,-Z-r 
r=O 
oc 
+ a2  c p;€y-  1  + €;. 
r=o 
Similarly,  oc 
(3b)  .  m, = P2ml-1  + PI% c  a;m,-z-r 
1=0 
a 
If  in (2a)-(2b)  al,  a2,  PI,  and p2 are all nonzero, then the univariate auto- 
regressions would be characterized by  an  infinite lag distribution. If  €;  and 
E:  are white noise,  the disturbances in the univariate autogressions would 
be  infinite-order MA processes.  Clearly,  (2a) and  (2b) are only consistent 
with univariate autoregressive representations for el and m, if a2 = PI = 0. 
Finally, a remark about the interpretation of  any observed contemporane- 
ous correlation between the innovations in a vector autoregression. Branson 
argues, for example, that a positive correlation between innovations in the 
money supply and the exchange rate reflects the response of  the exchange 
rate to unanticipated open market operations,  while  a negative correlation 
suggests monetary (“leaning  against the wind”)  intervention aimed at sta- 
bilizing the exchange rate in response, say, to current account disturbances. 
While I  have no quarrel with  Branson’s interpretation of  the correlations 
contained in the paper, it is important to realize that the stochastic properties 
of  the data themselves cannot establish whether m responds to innovations 
in  e, e responds to innovations in  m, or both respond to each other’s inno- 
vations.  The  effect of  unanticipated e  on  m  is  observationally equivalent 
with the effect of unanticipated m on  e (Buiter 1983). Consider the follow- 
ing example: 
(44  el = u1 + bl[m, -  E(m, I I,-dI  + 4, 
(4b)  m, = a2  + bz[et -  E(e, I I,-~)I  + E:. 
The reduced form of  this model is given by 
(5a) 
(5b) 
el = ul + (1 -  blb2)-’(e: + ble7) = ul  + u;, 
m, = u2 + (1 -  b1b2)-’(~7  + 62~:)  = a2  + UP. 
Let e; and ~y be white noise disturbances that are also contemporaneously 
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The covariance between the reduced-form  disturbances  up  and urn  in (5a) 
and (5b) is given by 
(6)  E(u'u")  = (1 - b1b2)-2(blu~m  + b2&) 
If  we know on a priori grounds that money does not respond to exchange 
rate surprises (b2 = 0), then E(u'u")  = bla:fn  and b, can be identified and 
estimated using  the  estimated  variance-covariance  matrix  of  the  reduced- 
form disturbances since b, = E(u'u")/E(u")'.  If  instead the exchange rate 
does not  respond  to  money  surprises  (b, =  0), then  E(ueu'") =  bz&, 
E(u'u")/E(u'")~  = b2uie/(a> + b;&)  and b, = E(u'u'")/E(u')*. The data 
themselves cannot tell  us whether  b, = 0, b,  = 0, or both  b, and bZ are 
nonzero. 
Prior information  must  be used  to overcome this  identification  problem. 
If it can be assumed, for example, that b, 3  0 and b2 S 0, then a negative 
value for E(u'um) is (from [6]) only consistent  with  a (negative)  policy  re- 
sponse of m to e.  Even if  we accept the constraint bl 3  0, one may well be 
able to imagine policy  scenarios under which  b2 > 0. "Leaning  with  the 
wind"  in  the  foreign  exchange market  can be  shown to be  optimal  under 
certain  conditions (Buiter and Eaton  1981). In that case the positive corre- 
lation between  up  and urn  reflects both any positive structural effect of  m on 
e(bl 2  0) and the positive policy response of m to e(b2 > 0). Only detailed 
prior knowledge of the actual form of the policy response  rules will enable 
us  to extract useful  information  from  correlations  between  the innovations 
in vector autoregressions. 
COmment  Peter B. Kenen 
If 1 had read only the summary of  findings at the start of  Branson's  paper, 
I  would have had no quarrel  with him. His descriptions of national policies 
seem eminently sensible. Having read his whole paper carefully, I  find my- 
self in difficulty.  I agree with most of  his conclusions but have many doubts 
about the way that he obtains them. 
I do not  have much trouble with  the  model  that  Branson  uses  to  define 
the questions he wants to investigate. It is a standard asset market model of 
exchange rate  determination that  is  made forward  looking  by  introducing 
rational  expectations. (If  I  understand  the model, most  of  the comparative 
static results  could  be  obtained  with  stationary  expectations. The rational 
expectations form serves mainly to draw the distinction between anticipated 
and  unanticipated  shocks-a  distinction  Branson  needs  later  to  treat  his 
regression  residuals  as proxies for unanticipated  shocks.) 
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have been  easier for me to follow his presentation if  Branson had  told  us 
from  the  start that  “reserves”  held  by  the  central bank  do not  differ  in 
character from the foreign assets held by the public (that R is part of F);  this 
is why  reserve use for official intervention is the same as an  open market 
sale of  foreign assets to domestic asset holders. My question has to do with 
the assumption that (6k/6F) = 0. In most asset market models, this term or 
one like it must be negative for the model to be stable; an  increase in F  is 
an increase in wealth, and it must reduce F, the capital outflow or current 
account  surplus, if  the  economy is to reach  a stationary state.  I  wonder, 
then, whether Branson’s assumption could impair the stability of his model. 
1 have somewhat more  serious questions about the use of  this  standard 
model for the main purpose of the paper--empirical  work on exchange rate 
determination and official intervention. The model describes a small country 
facing a homogeneous world. There is one exchange rate and one foreign 
asset.  The countries with  which  Branson  deals in his empirical work  are 
large in  every sense,  and the outside world  is not  homogeneous. Branson 
does not face this problem squarely, and when the numbers force him to do 
something about it, whether he wants to or not, he tries to make the coun- 
tries fit his model rather than making his model fit the countries. 
Let me add right away that it would be very difficult to make the model 
fit the countries. It would be necessary to deal simultaneously with a number 
of interdependent economies, each one holding assets in the others’ curren- 
cies and affecting by  its policies all of  the bilateral exchange rates for its 
currency. One could, of  course, determine the effects of policies, domestic 
and foreign, on the behavior of  the effective exchange rate. But  one would 
have to begin with the effects on the relevant bilateral exchange rates and to 
take  account of  the foreign repercussions relevant to each  such rate.  One 
could  thus  measure the influence of  United  States monetary policy  on the 
effective exchange rate for the dollar by  determining its impact on the mark- 
dollar rate,  the yen-dollar rate,  and so on, allowing fully for the German 
and Japanese responses, including both endogenous and policy responses. 
What has Branson done? He has tried to fit four large countries into his 
small-country model by  working directly with effective exchange rates and 
making  no allowance for foreign repercussions or for the effects of  other 
countries’ policies. His vector autoregressions for the United States include 
the effective exchange rate for the dollar,  the ratio of  domestic to foreign 
prices corresponding conceptually to the effective rate, and the current ac- 
count balance. They also include United States reserves, the United States 
money supply, and the United States short-term interest rate. The price ratio 
and current account balance may take some account implicitly of  events in 
other  countries,  including endogenous  responses to  events  in  the  United 
States, but they are far from adequate for this purpose. 
When  I  made  these  observations at  Bellagio,  during the  discussion of 
Branson’s paper,  several participants came to his defense. It would be im- 114  William H. Branson 
possible,  they  said,  to  execute  the  strategy  implied  by  my  criticism.  To 
capture the impact of official intervention on the effective exchange rate for 
the dollar,  one would  have to estimate vector autoregressions for all of the 
relevant bilateral exchange rates and include a larger number of  variables in 
every vector autoregression.  Each equation would have to include all of the 
bilateral  exchange rates, all of  the current account balances,  and all of the 
other  variables  for the  foreign  countries.  Branson  does not  have  enough 
degrees of freedom.  I  was at first inclined  to accept this defense,  but  I  am 
increasingly  dissatisfied  with  it. If  one cannot do things right, one should 
perhaps refrain from doing them at all. 
What are the practical  consequences  of  following  Branson’s  procedure? 
Two examples lead me to believe that it must misrepresent the influence of 
official intervention.  My first example illustrates the need to disaggregate- 
to work  separately with  the bilateral  exchange rates for each currency.  For 
most  of  the  period  covered  by  this  study, exchange  rate  arrangements  in 
Western  Europe  pegged  bilateral  rates  between  the  mark  and certain other 
European currencies.  The German authorities had to intervene whenever the 
relevant  bilateral  rates  reached  the  limits  of  the  bands  set  first  by  the 
“snake”  and then  by  the  EMS.  I  have  not  worked  carefully  through  the 
implications,  but I venture  a conjecture.  When the effective exchange  rate 
for the  mark  is  used  to  “explain”  the  behavior  of  German  reserves,  the 
vector autoregression will be unsatisfactory.  The coefficients of  the German 
reaction  function  implicit  in  its  coefficients  will  not  be  unbiased,  and  the 
residuals will not represent the  “innovations”  needed  later on. To measure 
the effects of intervention  accurately,  one has to disaggregate-to  separate 
the two types of  intervention residing in the German data and link each type 
of intervention to the relevant bilateral  exchange rates. ’ 
My  second  example illustrates  the  need  to include  foreign  variables  in 
each country’s vector autoregressions.  During most of the period covered by 
this  study, the  United  States authorities did not intervene regularly  on for- 
eign exchange markets.  When they did  intervene,  moreover,  they  concen- 
trated  on two or  three  bilateral  exchange  rates.  But  foreign  central  banks 
intervened extensively.  To capture the effects of intervention on the effec- 
tive exchange rate for the dollar, one should thus try to estimate the effects 
of  United  States  intervention  on  the two or three  bilateral  exchange  rates 
and,  simultaneously,  the  effects  of  foreign  intervention  on  those  and  the 
other bilateral rates that make up the effective rate. 
For  reasons  given  earlier, it  would  be  difficult  to  do this  correctly.  If 
I. One would expect both types of  intervention to affect both types of rates-those  that are 
pegged  by  intra-European arrangements  and  those that are not-and  the “cross effects”  may 
be  quite  strong.  (Some of  the intervention  undertaken  to  defend  the pegged  rates  is  done  In 
dollars rather than in European currencies,  and therefore it should affect the bilateral exchange 
rate  between  the  mark  and  dollar directly.)  But  the  correlations  between  the  two  types  of 
intervention and two types of  rates are apt to be different, and they should be identified instead 
of  being  “averaged”  into a single correlation between “innovations”  in total intervention and 
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intervention is not exogenous but can and should be described by  a reaction 
function,  we  should include  in  the  vector  autoregressions for the  United 
States all  variables for all foreign countries,  and this is not possible.  But 
there may be rough and ready ways to take account of  foreign intervention: 
1.  Using the small-country approach adopted by  Branson (i.e., using only 
United  States variables) but  working with  bilateral exchange rates for the 
dollar,  not  with  the effective rate,  we  could obtain new  sets of  exchange 
rate residuals. We could then calculate the simple correlations between Ger- 
man reserves and the mark-dollar residuals, between Japanese reserves and 
the yen-dollar rate, and so on. 
2. If  we  were to look  at  Branson’s vector autoregressions for reserves, 
we  would probably find that  very  few  of  the right-hand-side variables are 
significant. In this event, it would be possible to run three new equations- 
one for the mark-dollar exchange rate containing all of the United States and 
German variables, one for German reserves containing the mark-dollar rate 
(or the effective exchange rate for the mark) and one or two other variables, 
and  an equation for United States reserves containing the mark-dollar rate 
(or the effective exchange rate for the dollar) and one or two other variables. 
We  could then  run  simple correlations between the residuals from the ex- 
change rate equation and the residuals from the reserve equations. 
These methods are imperfect. The second, for example, runs afoul of  my 
earlier  objection-that  some  German  intervention  is  mandated  by  intra- 
European monetary arrangements. But  they may  take us  farther than Bran- 
son’s approach. 
As  I  have concentrated heavily on  intervention, let me  continue in that 
vein. I have two more problems. In Branson’s paper, intervention is identi- 
fied with quarter-to-quarter changes in official foreign exchange holdings (in 
the series on line  1 .d.d of International Financial Statistics). If  these are the 
figures he has used, he is wrong to say that they can turn negative. Further- 
more, Branson mentions the valuation problem but says that it is small. He 
does  not  mention  a  much  larger problem: changes in  the  figures are  not 
necessarily due to intervention. During the fourth quarter of  1978, when the 
United States began to intervene heavily to keep the dollar from depreciat- 
ing,  it  sold large quantities of  foreign exchange. Nevertheless, its official 
foreign exchange holdings rose by $4.34 billion. Why? Because the United 
States drew on its reserve position in the IMF and issued the Carter bonds. 
It  borrowed more foreign exchange than  it used. There are other instances 
of  this  sort,  and one must make careful corrections for them before using 
changes in foreign exchange holdings to represent official intervention. We 
cannot correct them completely, but we should do what we can. There is no 
excuse for running data from a tape into a regression program without in- 
specting, let alone correcting them. 
My  last  point  has  to  do  with  the  reliability of  the  results  reported  in 
Branson’s paper.  For example,  the results  in table  2.13, which deals with 
Japan, come from vector autoregressions that use MI to represent the Japa- 
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nese money supply.  The correlation between  innovations in reserves  and  in 
the exchange  rate  is  .33 and is significant.  The results  in  table  2.14,  also 
dealing with  Japan, come from vector  autoregressions that use M3 to rep- 
resent  the  money  supply. The correlation between  the  same sets of  “inno- 
vations”  is .12 and is not signficant. What conclusion should we draw about 
the effectiveness of  intervention?  It  may  be best to  render the old Scottish 
verdict-not  proven-until  we  can discriminate  decisively  between  the  re- 
duced forms implicit in alternative specifications. I have grave doubts about 
the  validity of  the rational  expectations  hypothesis.  Even  those  who think 
that it is valid, however,  should entertain doubts about using residuals from 
reduced-form regressions to represent the unexpected. 
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